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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against 
multiple prosecutions or punishments by the government for the 
same offense.1  Traditionally, and most often, double-jeopardy 
concerns arise when the court subjects defendants to multiple 
trials.2  When a defendant is in danger of twice being put in 
jeopardy, the policies of finality3 and the policies against 
governmental overreaching4 invoke enforcement of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, barring the government from harassing the 
defendant with multiple prosecutions or punishments.5  But when a 
final judgment in the form of an acquittal, conviction, or 
punishment does not materialize in the proceeding, jeopardy 
continues until a final result occurs.6 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in State v. Jeffries7 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second plea agreement 
after the trial court unconditionally accepts and records the first 
guilty plea.8  The court also held that a guilty plea does not forfeit9 
a defendant’s right to plead double jeopardy, because the 
Constitution precludes multiple prosecutions and punishments for 
the same offense, regardless of a defendant’s admission of guilt.10 
 
 1. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 169 (1873). 
 2. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1781, at 659–60 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). 
 3. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion) (articulating the “constitutional 
policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit”)). 
 4. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 (1984). 
 5. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978); accord State v. Thomas, 995 A.2d 65, 
71 (Conn. 2010) (“The policy justifications for prohibiting successive prosecutions 
include: (1) furthering society’s interest in protecting the integrity of final 
judgments; and (2) protecting individuals from prosecutorial overreaching and 
the continued embarrassment, anxiety and expense associated with repeated 
attempts to convict.” (citation omitted)). 
 6. Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 
1839–40 (1997). 
 7. 806 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011). 
 8. Id. at 64. 
 9. Some case law has used the term “waiver” instead of “forfeiture” 
regarding the effect of a guilty plea on the constitutional rights of defendants, but 
the Jeffries opinion clarifies that the term “forfeit” is more accurate, relying on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s statement, “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the 
timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right.’”  See id. at 64 n.4 (quoting United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). 
 10. Id. at 65 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975)). 
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This case note begins by exploring the history of double-
jeopardy cases involving guilty pleas.11  Then it discusses the facts of 
Jeffries and the court’s decision.12  It argues that the court correctly 
concluded that a defendant’s right to plead double jeopardy 
cannot be forfeited by entering a guilty plea, but that the court 
failed to properly analyze when plea agreements should implicate 
double-jeopardy concerns.13  This case note concludes by asserting 
that the court upheld the finality of the judgment but failed to 
address the harm this holding will have on the accuracy of future 
sentences.14  In the alternative, this case note suggests the court 
should have held the judge’s decision to vacate the guilty plea to 
the same standard applied to defendants’ motions to withdraw 
guilty pleas prior to sentencing.15 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Origins of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states 
that no one shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”16  The Minnesota Constitution similarly 
states that “no person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment 
for the same offense.”17 
Jeopardy is “[t]he risk of conviction and punishment that a 
criminal defendant faces at trial.”18  William Blackstone19 
summarized double jeopardy as a “universal maxim . . . that no 
man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life or limb more than 
once for the same offence.”20  As early as the 1870s, the U.S. 
 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. A defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be granted if it is “fair 
and just to do so.”  MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2. 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793 (1969) 
(applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 17. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.  This case note collectively refers to both the U.S. 
and Minnesota clauses as the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
 18. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 912 (9th ed. 2009). 
 19. For an account of Blackstone’s career and the historical significance of 
his lectures and treatise, see IAN DOOLITTLE, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: A BIOGRAPHY 
(2001). 
 20. GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 27 
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Supreme Court described the Double Jeopardy Clause as guarding 
“against the action of the same court in inflicting punishment 
twice” and “from chances or danger of a second punishment on a 
second trial.”21  The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants 
from multiple prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal22 or 
conviction23 and from multiple punishments for the same offense.24  
Double-jeopardy claims are based on promoting finality,25 
preventing governmental overreaching,26 minimizing the 
“harassing exposure to the harrowing experience of a criminal 
trial,”27 and protecting the right to proceed with the selected jury.28 
B. When Jeopardy Attaches 
Courts must establish when jeopardy attaches in a criminal 
proceeding to determine whether the case implicates the purposes 
and policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause.29  “It is only after a 
defendant is deemed to have been put in former jeopardy that any 
subsequent prosecution of the defendant brings the guarantee 
 
(1998) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
335–36 (photo. reprint, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1786)). 
 21. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 169 (1873). 
 22. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896); see, e.g., Green v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). 
 23. Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 186–87 (1889). 
 24. Justices of Bos. Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306–07 (1984); see, e.g., 
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 168; see 
also David S. Rudstein, A Brief History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double 
Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 194 (2005) (discussing the origins of the 
double-jeopardy guarantees). 
 25. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (discussing finality in deciding when 
jeopardy attaches in a jury trial); Green, 355 U.S. at 187 (concluding that finality 
protects defendants from a second criminal trial); Kyden Creekpaum, What’s 
Wrong with a Little More Double Jeopardy? A 21st Century Recalibration of an Ancient 
Individual Right, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1179, 1182 (2007) (considering the virtue of 
finality). 
 26. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501–02 (1984) (holding that continued 
prosecution of remaining charges after a guilty plea did not implicate the double-
jeopardy principles of finality and governmental overreaching). 
 27. State v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2011) (Gildea, C.J., 
dissenting); see, e.g., State v. Pederson, 262 Minn. 568, 570–71, 115 N.W.2d 466, 
468 (1962) (reasoning that double-jeopardy concerns protect individuals from 
harassment by forbidding multiple trials); State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62, 62 
N.W.2d 512, 516 (1954) (stating that no one should be “unduly harassed” by the 
State’s attempt to try the same offense multiple times). 
 28. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d at 13 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting). 
 29. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975). 
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against double jeopardy into play.”30  “Thus, the time at which 
jeopardy attached is best viewed as the point at which ‘the risks of 
injury are so great that the government should have to “shoulder” 
the “heavy” burden of showing manifest necessity for repetitious 
proceedings.’”31 
Courts have consistently held that double jeopardy attaches in 
a jury trial when the jury is selected and sworn32 or when the judge 
begins hearing evidence during a bench trial.33  But courts across 
the country take various positions as to when jeopardy attaches in 
cases of guilty pleas.34 
In Ricketts v. Adamson,35 the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
the issue of “whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the 
prosecution of respondent for first-degree murder following his 
breach of a plea agreement under which he had pleaded guilty to a 
lesser offense, had been sentenced, and had begun serving a term 
of imprisonment.”36  The Court agreed with the State that 
“respondent’s breach of the plea arrangement to which the parties 
had agreed removed the double-jeopardy bar to prosecution of 
respondent on the first-degree murder charge.”37  The Court simply 
assumed that “jeopardy attached at least when respondent was 
sentenced . . . on his plea of guilty.”38 
Ricketts did not consider whether jeopardy attaches prior to 
sentencing, such as upon acceptance of a guilty plea, because the 
vacation of the defendant’s plea and the re-prosecution occurred 
after he was sentenced.39  The trial court had sentenced the 
defendant, and he had begun serving time, thus invoking the 
policies of finality and prevention of prosecutorial overreaching 
 
 30. State v. Angel, 51 P.3d 1155, 1157 (N.M. 2002). 
 31. United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 618 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting 
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.1(c) (1984)). 
 32. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388; accord Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978); 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977); Downum v. 
United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737–38 (1963). 
 33. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 25.1(d) (3d ed. 2011); 
see also Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388; McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir. 
1936). 
 34. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 68–69 (Minn. 2011) (Gildea, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 35. 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (articulating the Court’s only statement referring to 
when double jeopardy attaches in a guilty plea). 
 36. Id. at 3. 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 4–8. 
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protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.40  But despite these 
double-jeopardy concerns, the Court held that the defendant’s 
breach of the plea agreement barred a double-jeopardy defense.41 
Several state and federal district courts have concluded that 
jeopardy does not attach prior to sentencing.42  In United States v. 
Santiago Soto, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that “jeopardy 
did not attach when the district court accepted the guilty plea to 
the lesser included offense and then rejected the plea without 
having imposed sentence and entered judgment.”43  The court 
reasoned that the “mere acceptance of a guilty plea does not carry 
the same expectation of finality and tranquility that comes with a 
jury’s verdict or with an entry of judgment and sentence.”44 
In State v. Angel, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that 
“jeopardy did not attach when the magistrate court accepted 
Defendant’s . . . plea . . . [but] dismissed the charges prior to 
sentencing.”45  The court stated that the defendant’s subsequent 
prosecution did not violate the double-jeopardy concerns of finality 
or overreaching, because the court dismissed the charges to which 
he pled guilty to prior to sentencing.46 
In State v. Duval, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of “whether double jeopardy prevents a judge from imposing 
a harsher sentence on defendant than that originally intended after 
acceptance of his plea.”47  The court held that the policy concern of 
governmental overreaching was not implicated and that the trial 
court “ought be able to correct a mistake.”48  The court concluded 
that jeopardy did not attach at the initial acceptance of the guilty 
plea, and even if it did, “it was not irrevocable.”49 
Other courts have held that “[j]eopardy attaches with the 
acceptance of a guilty plea.”50  In United States v. Sanchez, the Fifth 
 
 40. Id. at 4–6. 
 41. Id. at 10. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 618 (1st Cir. 1987); 
State v. Angel, 51 P.3d 1155, 1157 (N.M. 2002); State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 324 
(Vt. 1991). 
 43. 825 F.2d at 620. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 51 P.3d at 1159. 
 46. Id. at 1158–59 (citing State v. Alingog, 877 P.2d 562 (N.M. 1994)). 
 47. 589 A.2d at 324. 
 48. Id. at 325. 
 49. Id. 
 50. United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United 
States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
6
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Circuit Court of Appeals clarified that a judge has wide discretion 
whether to accept, reject, or conditionally accept a plea 
agreement,51 and it is only with an unconditional acceptance that 
jeopardy attaches.52  In Sanchez, the judge temporarily accepted the 
plea “until she had studied the probation report” but then later 
rejected the plea agreement.53 
In United States v. Cambindo Valencia, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals declared, “[I]t is axiomatic of the double jeopardy 
clause that jeopardy attached once . . . [the] guilty plea was 
accepted.”54  The issue of when jeopardy attached was not a primary 
issue in the case, though, which involved a complicated web of 
multiple defendants appealing multiple convictions for conspiracy 
to import and distribute cocaine, arising out of similar but distinct 
incidents.55 
In United States v. Bullock, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated that while “the process of arraignment and pleading has not 
been viewed as amounting to jeopardy . . . , jeopardy would attach 
when a plea of guilty is accepted.”56  The government notified the 
defendants in this case that they had unlawfully taken “migratory 
birds over a baited area” and informed them “they could forfeit a 
bond of $100 in lieu of standing trial.”57  The defendants sent the 
$100 checks.58  The government then dismissed the notice of 
violation, returned the checks, and charged the defendants under 
the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations.59  The 
court concluded that under circumstances involving pretrial events, 





Bullock, 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). 
 51. 609 F.2d at 762. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  “Because the judge made it clear that she was taking the agreement 
under advisement, jeopardy did not attach and she acted within the bounds of her 
discretion in rejecting the agreement and the plea after full consideration of the 
case.”  Id. 
 54. 609 F.2d at 637. 
 55. Id. at 606–07. 
 56. 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (citation omitted). 
 57. Id. at 1117–18. 
 58. Id. at 1118. 
 59. Id. at 1117 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976); 50 C.F.R. § 20.21 (1976)). 
 60. Id. at 1118.  
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The U.S. Supreme Court has held that retrial is barred only 
after jeopardy terminates.61  In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, a jury 
convicted the defendant of murder but deadlocked while deciding 
whether to impose the death penalty.62  The trial judge entered a 
life sentence.63  The defendant successfully appealed and had his 
conviction set aside.64  On retrial, the defendant was sentenced to 
death.65  The defendant argued that to impose a death sentence 
after already having imposed a life sentence was double jeopardy.66  
The Court disagreed.67  The Court reasoned that a conviction does 
not necessarily terminate jeopardy because a defendant can appeal 
the conviction, and the same jeopardy continues during the appeal 
process.68 
Concerns regarding double jeopardy arise when the defendant 
develops “a crystallized expectation of finality in his sentence.”69  
But, as discussed before, neither federal nor state precedent 
articulates a rule for when this expectation of finality occurs in 
guilty pleas.70  Disagreement, in part, centers on whether 
convictions provide the same level of finality as acquittals71 and 
whether convictions prior to sentencing provide the same level of 
finality as convictions after sentencing.72 
 
 61. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 106 (2003); Richardson v. United 
States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984) (discussing that double jeopardy “applies only if 
there has been some event . . . which terminates the original jeopardy”). 
 62. 537 U.S. at 104. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 105. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 109. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 106; see also Creekpaum, supra note 25, at 1184. 
 69. State v. Borrego, 661 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting 
State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Minn. 1998)).  See generally 11 DUNNELL 
MINN. DIGEST CRIMINAL LAW § 4.17 (5th ed. 2004) (considering the finality of 
acquittals, convictions, and sentences). 
 70. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 68 (Minn. 2011) (Gildea, C.J., dissenting); 
see, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 71. Compare United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132–33 (1980) 
(determining that finality of sentencing is less than finality of acquittals), with State 
v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that a conviction 
should be treated the same as an acquittal). 
 72. Compare United States v. Bullock, 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1978) (per 
curiam) (stating that jeopardy would attach when the court accepts the plea), with 
State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 324 (Vt. 1991) (explaining that “attachment of 
jeopardy upon the court’s acceptance of a guilty plea is neither automatic nor 
irrevocable”). 
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C. Forfeiture of Double-Jeopardy Pleas 
Double-jeopardy cases also confront the issue of whether a 
defendant can forfeit his or her right to plead double jeopardy.73  
Prior to the Jeffries decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that if a defendant did not assert a double-jeopardy claim at the 
appropriate time, he or she waived the right to plead double 
jeopardy.74  Minnesota case law75 had relied on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holdings that defendants could waive their constitutional 
rights.76 
In Menna v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that 
prior precedent did not stand for the principle that all counseled 
guilty pleas waive all constitutional rights.77  “[W]here the State is 
precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a 
defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a 
conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was 
entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.”78  In Menna, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause barred the State from bringing the 
defendant into court to begin with, so any subsequent guilty plea 
did not waive his right to plead double jeopardy.79  Similarly, 
Blackledge v. Perry dealt with the same issue and held that if a 
defendant asserted “the right not to be haled into court at all . . . [, 
then t]he very initiation of the proceedings against him in the 




 73. 11 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 69, § 4.17(a).  
Compare Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (holding that a guilty plea 
does not waive a claim if the State cannot constitutionally prosecute), with State 
ex rel. Boswell v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 408, 415, 154 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1967) (holding 
that a double-jeopardy claim is waived if the defendant does not enter the plea at 
the appropriate time). 
 74. Boswell, 278 Minn. at 414, 154 N.W.2d at 817. 
 75. E.g., State ex rel. Dunlap v. Utecht, 206 Minn. 41, 48, 287 N.W. 229, 232 
(1939) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (stating that a 
defendant can waive the constitutional right to assistance of counsel)). 
 76. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal 
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the 
offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims 
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry 
of the guilty plea.”). 
 77. 423 U.S. at 62 n.2. 
 78. Id. at 62 (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. 417 U.S. at 30–31. 
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Jeffries presented the Minnesota Supreme Court with the issue 
of when jeopardy attaches and terminates in a guilty plea.81  Jeffries 
also presented the court with the issue—in light of conflicting 
precedent—of whether a defendant can forfeit his or her 
constitutional right to plead double jeopardy.82 
III. THE JEFFRIES DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
On January 22, 2008, Erik Jeffries threw a glass egg at his 
girlfriend during an argument.83  The egg hit his girlfriend’s 
daughter in the face, causing lacerations that required stitches.84  
The State charged Jeffries with domestic assault, which was 
enhanced to a felony because he had at least two prior domestic 
assault convictions within the previous ten years.85 
Jeffries reached a negotiated plea deal with the State, and a 
plea hearing was held on June 13, 2008.86  Jeffries entered a guilty 
plea for felony domestic assault.87  The court responded by saying, 
“[B]ased upon the facts on the record, I’ll accept your plea of 
guilty and find you guilty.”88  The court conditionally released 
Jeffries, ordering him to appear for sentencing and attend 
meetings with probation to facilitate completion of the pre-
sentence investigation (PSI).89 
On the sentencing date, the court decided to no longer accept 
the plea agreement because of Jeffries’s extensive criminal history 
and the information contained in the PSI report.90  The court 
vacated the guilty plea and set a trial date.91  The court asked if 
 
 81. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 61 (Minn. 2011). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Appellant’s Brief at 5, Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56 (No. A09-1391), 2011 WL 
7415262 [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief]. 
 84. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 58. 
 85. Id.  “Whoever violates the provisions of this section . . . within ten years of 
the first of any combination of two or more previous qualified domestic violence-
related offense convictions or adjudications of delinquency is guilty of a 
felony . . . .”  MINN. STAT. § 609.2242, subdiv. 4 (2010). 
 86. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 58–59. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 59. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  The plea agreement had been a forty-eight-month stayed sentence.  
Id. at 58. 
 91. Id. at 60. 
10
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Jeffries’s attorney wanted to respond or put anything on the 
record.92  The attorney did not object on the record to the court’s 
vacation of Jeffries’s plea.93 
The parties reached a second plea deal, and a plea hearing was 
held on March 31, 2009.94  Jeffries pled guilty to felony domestic 
assault.95  The court accepted the plea and conditionally released 
Jeffries until the sentencing date.96  Two days after being released, 
the police arrested Jeffries for possessing marijuana, which violated 
his conditional release.97  The court executed the sixty-month 
sentence, pursuant to the plea agreement.98 
Jeffries argued on appeal that double jeopardy forbade the 
State from prosecuting him for the same offense a second time and 
that he had ineffective counsel.99  The court of appeals held that 
Jeffries waived his double-jeopardy claim by entering a second 
guilty plea and that he failed to show deprivation of effective 
assistance of counsel.100  The court of appeals did not rule on the 
double-jeopardy question.101 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
After granting review, the Minnesota Supreme Court framed 
the first issue as whether Jeffries was convicted at his first plea 
hearing.102  The court explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prohibits subsequent prosecutions after a conviction.103  The court 
determined that the trial court unconditionally accepted the first 
plea and recorded the plea.104  Based on these two factors, the court 
concluded that Jeffries was convicted at the first plea hearing.105  
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  The plea agreement consisted of “an executed sentence of 22 months 
if he complied with the conditions of release or a 60-month executed sentence if 
he did not.”  Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. State v. Jeffries, 787 N.W.2d 654, 661–62 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806 
N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011). 
 101. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 15, Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56 (No. A09-
1391), 2010 WL 8435269 [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief]. 
 102. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 61. 
 103. Id. at 60–61 (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)). 
 104. Id. at 63–64. 
 105. Id. at 64.  “‘Conviction’ means any of the following accepted and 
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Thus, “[t]he second prosecution for the same offense violated the 
Double Jeopardy Clause and must be set aside, unless . . . Jeffries 
forfeited his double-jeopardy claim” by entering a second guilty 
plea.106 
The court decided the forfeiture issue in the face of 
conflicting precedent.  Minnesota precedent indicated that double 
jeopardy constituted an affirmative defense, which was forfeited if 
not raised.107  Conversely, U.S. Supreme Court precedent preserved 
a defendant’s ability to raise a double-jeopardy claim on appeal, 
even if the defendant entered a counseled guilty plea.108  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court overruled state precedent and 
concluded that Menna was binding.109  The court held that “a 
counseled guilty plea does not bar a defendant from raising a 
double-jeopardy claim on appeal if that claim can be decided on 
the existing record at the time the defendant pleads guilty.”110 
The court determined that Jeffries’s double-jeopardy claim 
could be decided on the existing record and the claim was not 
forfeited by his second counseled guilty plea.111  The court reversed 
the conviction based on Jeffries’s second guilty plea, reinstated the 
initial plea, and remanded the case to the trial court for 
resentencing pursuant to the first plea agreement.112 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The analysis that follows argues that the court erred in holding 
that the unconditional acceptance at the first plea hearing barred 
the subsequent vacation of the guilty plea.  First, this section 
discusses when guilty pleas should implicate double-jeopardy 
concerns and whether the situation in Jeffries warranted such 
concerns.  Then, this section argues that the policy of accuracy 
must be weighed against the policy of finality, especially in 
domestic violence cases involving high risks to victim safety113 and 
 
recorded by the court: (1) a plea of guilty; or (2) a verdict of guilty by a jury or a 
finding of guilty by the court.”  MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 5 (2010). 
 106. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 64. 
 107. State ex rel. Boswell v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 408, 415, 154 N.W.2d 813,     
817–18 (1967). 
 108. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975). 
 109. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 65. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 65–66. 
 113. RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/13
  
318 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
offender recidivism.114  The analysis of the double-jeopardy issue 
concludes by suggesting the court should allow judges to vacate 
guilty pleas when it is “fair and just to do so.”115  This section ends 
by supporting the court’s holding that a defendant cannot forfeit a 
double-jeopardy claim by pleading guilty when the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State from bringing the defendant 
into court in the first place.116 
A. When Guilty Pleas Implicate Double-Jeopardy Concerns 
In Ricketts v. Adamson, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed 
attachment of jeopardy in guilty pleas, but the situation in Ricketts 
differed from Jeffries because Jeffries had not been sentenced yet 
and had not begun to serve a sentence.117  Thus, Jeffries required the 
Minnesota Supreme Court to decide the issue of when jeopardy 
attaches prior to sentencing. 
The majority in Jeffries erred by simply determining whether 
the trial court convicted Jeffries at the first plea hearing.118  The 
court should have questioned whether that conviction barred the 
trial court from later vacating the plea agreement.119  The court’s 
opinion promoted the policy of finality, but the Jeffries decision will 
have a negative impact on the accuracy of sentences in future cases.  
The standard applied to defendants’ motions to withdraw guilty 




SERVS., PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE PROBLEM-SPECIFIC GUIDES SERIES NO. 
45: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (2007), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov 
/Publications/e12061550.pdf (“[D]omestic violence accounts for about 20 
percent of the nonfatal violent crime women experience.”). 
 114.  Id. at 24 (“[F]or the most part, recidivism remains high.”). 
 115.  Extending the standard set forth in MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2. 
 116.  Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 65 (overruling state precedent and adopting 
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975)). 
 117.  Compare Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 3 (1987) (explaining that the 
defendant “had been sentenced, and had begun serving a term of 
imprisonment”), with Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 59 (describing that the judge indicated 
he would no longer accept the plea agreement prior to sentencing). 
 118.  Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 64. 
 119.  Id. at 71 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a defendant’s conduct 
can continue jeopardy in a proceeding, even if convicted, if he consents to the 
vacation of his guilty plea and the continuation of the proceedings). 
 120.  MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2 (articulating that defendants may 
withdraw their guilty pleas prior to sentencing if it would be “fair and just to do 
so”). 
13
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Jeopardy must attach in order to bar a second prosecution of 
the same offense.121  The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held 
that a conviction occurs at the time the trial court accepts a guilty 
plea and adjudicates guilt on the record.122  In that case, the court 
concluded, “[I]t would be anomalous to treat a conviction . . . 
differently than an acquittal.”123  The court has held that an 
acquittal cannot be subject to appeal, even if erroneous, because 
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial.124  Therefore, the 
court has said a conviction carries similar weight as acquittals in 
double-jeopardy cases.125 
But there are many ways that convictions through plea 
negotiations are treated differently than acquittals.  Defendants can 
withdraw their pleas prior to sentencing when it is “fair and just to 
do so.”126  Defendants can appeal their convictions.127  Various 
jurisdictions have come to different conclusions regarding when 
jeopardy attaches in plea deals,128 while every jurisdiction affords 
the same standard to acquittals.129  As the First Circuit Court of 
 
 121. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984). 
 122. State v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2011).  But see United 
States v. Combs, 634 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a 
defendant was not formally convicted until sentencing of an accepted guilty plea). 
 123. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d at 8 n.9 (explaining that “an acquittal may 
be accorded more weight for policy reasons” but that “does not change 
the . . . prohibition of a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction”). 
 124. State v. Large, 607 N.W.2d 774, 779–80 (Minn. 2000). 
 125. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d at 8. 
 126. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2.  Defendants can also withdraw their 
pleas post-sentencing if they show “manifest injustice.”  Id. subdiv. 1. 
 127. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02, subdiv. 2 (stating that a “defendant may appeal as 
of right from any adverse final judgment”). 
 128. Compare United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 620 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(holding that jeopardy did not attach prior to sentencing), State v. Angel, 51 P.3d 
1155, 1157 (N.M. 2002) (stating that “jeopardy did not attach to Defendant’s no-
contest plea prior to sentencing”), and State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 325 (Vt. 1991) 
(reasoning that a court should be able to erase a plea acceptance in order to 
correct a mistake without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause), with United 
States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that temporary 
acceptance did not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause but that unconditional 
acceptance of a guilty plea would), United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 
603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979) (declaring that jeopardy attached once the defendant’s 
guilty plea was accepted), and United States v. Bullock, 579 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (finding that the events in this case were pretrial 
proceedings, not implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause, but stating that 
jeopardy would have attached if the plea had been accepted). 
 129. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).  The Court quoted 
Blackstone,  
14
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Appeals has stated, in a case in which “the judge initially accepted 
the guilty plea but then rejected it within the same proceeding, 
defendant was not placed in jeopardy in any meaningful sense.”130  
But it is hard to imagine a case in which a judge could acquit a 
defendant but then “un-acquit” him in the same proceeding, 
without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The trial court has three options when confronted with a plea 
agreement.  The court can accept the plea, reject the plea, or 
conditionally accept the plea.131  Based on the language used by the 
trial court in Jeffries, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded the 
plea was unconditionally accepted and therefore constituted a 
conviction.132  But the use of unconditional language should not 
prohibit a fair and just revision of the plea agreement, based on 
troublesome information contained in the PSI.133 
In State v. Duval, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded that 
“the rule is only that jeopardy ‘generally’ attaches at the time of 
acceptance of the guilty plea,” but that the rule has exceptions.134  
The court described the issue in Duval as “much narrower and 
simpler” than typical double-jeopardy issues, phrasing it as 
“whether the court ought be able to correct a mistake.”135  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court should have recognized the same 
difference in Jeffries. 
[G]iven the false assumptions preceding the “acceptance” 
of the plea, the acceptance should have no more legal 
significance than the mistake that led to it.  The court 
 
“[T]he plea of autrefoits acquit, or a former acquittal,” he wrote, “is 
grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England, that 
no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the 
same offence.”  Today, every State incorporates some form of the 
prohibition in its constitution or common law. 
Id. 
 130. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d at 620.  Jeffries differs from Santiago Soto because the 
judge did not accept and then reject the plea agreement within the same hearing, 
but the First Circuit did not require acceptance and rejection to be during the 
same hearing, only before the sentencing hearing.  See id. 
 131. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.04, subdiv. 3(1).  “When a plea is entered and the 
defendant questioned, the trial court judge must reject or accept the plea of guilty 
on the terms of the plea agreement.  The court may postpone its acceptance or 
rejection until it has received the results of a pre-sentence investigation.”  Id. 
 132. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Minn. 2011). 
 133. Id. at 59–60.  The trial court accepted the guilty plea and said Jeffries was 
convicted of felony domestic assault, but then the court ordered a pre-sentence 
investigation and continued the matter for sentencing.  Id. at 59. 
 134. 589 A.2d 321, 324 (Vt. 1991). 
 135. Id. at 325. 
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simply corrected the mistake by erasing the plea 
acceptance and proceeded to treat the case as it should 
have been treated from the outset.136 
The Vermont Supreme Court made the policy decision “to 
encourage more probing by judges and to allow reasonable room 
to correct mistakes.”137 
If the Minnesota Supreme Court had ruled that a judge could 
vacate a guilty plea for fair and just reasons, then jeopardy would 
not have attached, the proceeding would have continued, and an 
appropriate sentence would have resulted. 
1. Convictions: Courts Must Balance Finality Against Accuracy 
Finality is an important policy that courts must guard closely.138  
But it is not an absolute rule, especially in plea negotiations.139  An 
exception to the finality rule is a defendant’s right to withdraw a 
guilty plea.140  Also, a conviction may not concern finality if a trial 
court accepts a guilty plea but imposes conditions on the defendant 
prior to sentencing.  If a defendant fails to comply with a condition, 
the State has “the authority to vacate the underlying conviction.  
Once the underlying conviction has been vacated, the defendant is 
in the same position as if the conviction had been reversed on 
appeal.”141 
Neither the State nor Jeffries relied on the finality of the plea 
agreement,142 even though the court accepted the plea and said, 
“[Y]ou are convicted.”143  Both parties agreed that if Jeffries violated 
the conditions of his release,144 the deal would be off.145  One 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Creekpaum, supra note 25, at 1190. 
 139. See United States v. Santiago Soto, 825 F.2d 616, 620 (1st Cir. 1987); 
Duval, 589 A.2d at 325. 
 140. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05. 
 141. THOMAS, supra note 20, at 224; see, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 
(1987). 
 142. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 74–75 (Minn. 2011) (Anderson, G. Barry, 
J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 59. 
 144. Jeffries’s conditions included appearing for PSI meetings, giving 
information to the probation officer, and appearing for sentencing.  Id. 
 145. Id.  The attorneys disagreed about what would happen if Jeffries failed to 
comply with his conditions, but they both agreed that the deal would change.  Id.  
The court referenced the prosecutor’s statement, “[D]efendant’s appearance at 
sentencing and his cooperation with the [(PSI)] is a condition of the deal” and 
the defense’s reply, “[I]f the deal is off, then the deal should be off.”  Id.  
16
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condition of Jeffries’s release prior to sentencing was to attend 
appointments related to completing the PSI report,146 which 
compiles information influential to determining an appropriate 
sentence.147  The rules should “provide that a trial judge error—
even one in the defendant’s favor—can be reversed . . . .  The game 
need not end—jeopardy may continue—until an error-free result is 
obtained.”148 
Decisions regarding when jeopardy attaches “represent a 
policy choice” between finality and accuracy.149  This case note 
argues that courts must balance finality with accuracy.150  Chief 
Justice Gildea correctly favored accuracy over finality in her 
dissenting opinion, stating that the trial court had the “discretion 
to withdraw its acceptance of a guilty plea once it learned of 
additional information about Jeffries’s criminal history that caused 
the court to believe the plea agreement was not in the interest of 
justice.”151  The rules provide that a court “may accept a plea 
agreement of the parties when the interest of justice would be 
served.”152  Also, precedent indicates that an agreement that “‘is 
injurious to the interests of the public or contravenes some 
established interest of society’ is void.”153  The court’s authority to 
determine whether a plea agreement promotes justice should 
continue even after the court accepts a plea agreement.154  
Accuracy promotes justice; a court must have discretion to correct 
 
 146. Id. at 75 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting). 
 147. MINN. STAT. § 609.2244, subdiv. 1 (2010) requires a PSI when a defendant 
is convicted of a domestic violence-related offense as described in MINN. STAT. 
§ 518B.01, subdiv. 2. 
 148. Amar, supra note 6, at 1841. 
 149. Creekpaum, supra note 25, at 1184. 
 150. See id. at 1187–88 (advocating for a “framework of accuracy and finality, 
with the goal of maximizing the gain accorded accuracy while minimizing the 
violence inflicted on finality”). 
 151. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 71 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting). 
 152. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.04, subdiv. 3(2). 
 153. State v. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Minn. 2011) (Anderson, G. 
Barry, J., dissenting) (quoting Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 725 
N.W.2d 90, 92–93 (Minn. 2006) (discussing contracts void for public policy 
violations)); see also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689–90 (1949) (demonstrating 
that courts have the authority to prohibit a jury from giving a certain verdict when 
“the ends of public justice would . . . be defeated”). 
 154. Martinez-Mendoza, 804 N.W.2d at 14 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting) (stating that 
if the court gains new information, which leads the court to believe that the 
interests of justice are not served by the plea deal, the court may withdraw its 
acceptance). 
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an inappropriate plea agreement, prior to sentencing.155 
Some courts have decided that jeopardy does not attach when 
acceptance of a guilty plea is based on inaccurate information 
about prior convictions,156 misinformation about the facts of a 
plea,157 or a misunderstanding about the terms of the plea 
agreement.158  These courts recognize that accuracy must prevail 
over finality in situations involving erroneous plea agreements. 
2. Accuracy Is Particularly Important in Domestic Assault Cases 
Accuracy in judgments and appropriateness of sentences are 
essential in domestic violence cases, where criminal history is 
particularly important.159  Legal interventions are necessary to 
break the cycle of abuse, because domestic violence is likely to 
continue and escalate if law enforcement and the justice system do 
not respond and hold offenders accountable.160  “Unlike 
participants in a barroom brawl or street skirmish, perpetrators of 
domestic violence present a particularly high risk for continuing, 
even escalating violence against the complainant as they seek 
further control over her choices and actions.”161 
Domestic abusers are more likely to re-offend than other types 
of perpetrators.162  “Domestic violence is the number one source of 
injury to women in the United States, ‘causing more injuries than 
 
 155. Cf. State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. 2000) (holding 
that when a plea agreement is based on a mutual mistake of fact, the plea may be 
withdrawn). 
 156. E.g., State v. Burris, 40 S.W.3d 520, 526–27 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). 
 157. E.g., Gilmore v. Zimmerman, 793 F.2d 564, 569–70 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 158. E.g., State v. Angel, 51 P.3d 1155, 1157 (N.M. 2002); State v. Duval, 589 
A.2d 321, 324 (Vt. 1991). 
 159. See WATCH, PROMOTING VICTIM SAFETY AND OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY: 
IMPROVING THE RESPONSE TO MISDEMEANOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 9 (2011), 
available at http://www.watchmn.org/sites/default/files/Suburban%20FINAL.pdf 
(describing domestic violence as “a repeated pattern of abuse used to control an 
intimate partner,” which indicates a high likelihood of repeat offenses). 
 160. Id. at 1.  “Domestic violence is a crime that more often than not escalates 
without intervention and how the justice system responds to initial assaults and 
calls for help can significantly impact whether or not battering will continue or be 
deterred.”  Id. 
 161. Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: The 
Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000). 
 162. Id. at 4 n.10 (“The recidivism rate for crimes of violence between 
intimates is two and one-half times that for violence between strangers.” (citing 
Elena Salzman, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention Program: A Model 
Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 329, 344 n.83 
(1994))). 
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rapes, auto accidents and muggings combined.’”163  Regardless of 
these safety risks, sentences for domestic assaults remain lenient 
relative to other crimes such as controlled substance or DUI 
offenses.164 
Battering is a learned behavior.165  When men166 choose to 
batter and face no consequences for their actions, they will 
continue the behavior that works.167  Every year the Minnesota 
Coalition for Battered Women issues a Femicide Report, 
documenting the deaths caused by domestic violence in 
Minnesota.168  In the 2011 report, the Coalition made this decree: 
“When mistakes are made, people can and do lose their lives.  The 
stakes are too high for us to get it wrong.  We must prioritize 
safety.”169 
Chief Judge of the State of New York and Chief Judge of the 
New York Court of Appeals, Judith S. Kaye, along with her 
colleague Susan K. Knipps, advocates for judicial officers to take a 
problem-solving approach when confronted with domestic violence 
cases.170  “If we handle them inadequately, tragedies occur.  Lives 
 
 163. Id. at 3 (quoting Tonya McCormick, Note and Comment, Convicting 
Domestic Violence Abusers When the Victim Remains Silent, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 427, 428 
(1999)). 
 164. CAROLINE BETTINGER-LOPEZ ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE STATE’S OBLIGATION TO PROTECT: CIVIL SOCIETY BRIEFING 
PAPERS ON COMMUNITY, MILITARY AND CUSTODY 52 (2011), available at 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/vaw (“Yet, sentences––even for recidivist batterers––
remain relatively lenient.  The results of those light dispositions may greatly 
endanger victims.” (footnote omitted) (citing Cynthia D. Cook, Triggered: Targeting 
Domestic Violence Offenders in California, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 328, 333 (2000))). 
 165. MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, HANDBOOK FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS ON 
BATTERED WOMEN’S ISSUES 11 (2006) [hereinafter HANDBOOK], available at 
http://www.mcbw.org/files/u1/Elected_Official_Handbook.pdf.  The definition 
of “batter” is “to beat with successive blows so as to bruise, shatter, or demolish; . . . 
to subject to strong, overwhelming, or repeated attack; . . . to strike heavily and 
repeatedly.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 104 (11th ed. 2003). 
 166. Women batter as well, but the vast majority of abusers are male.  See 
HANDBOOK, supra note 165, at 8 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS: VIOLENCE BETWEEN 
INTIMATES (1994) (“90–95% of domestic violence victims are women.”)). 
 167. Id. at 11.  “Men use physical, emotional, and/or sexual abuse to maintain 
power and control over their relationships with their female partners.  They have 
learned that violence works to achieve this end.”  Id. 
 168. At least thirty-four people died as a result of domestic violence in 2011 in 
Minnesota.  MINN. COAL. FOR BATTERED WOMEN, FEMICIDE REPORT 3 (2011) 
[hereinafter FEMICIDE REPORT], available at http://www.mcbw.org/files/images 
/2011_Femicide_Report_FINAL_1.pdf. 
 169. Id. at 18. 
 170. Kaye & Knipps, supra note 161, at 5–6. 
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are lost.  And public confidence in our justice system moves down 
yet another notch.  If we refuse to take action, refuse to change, we 
may preserve our traditions and decorum.  But at what cost?”171 
Coming to a simplistic conclusion that an acceptance of a 
guilty plea constitutes a conviction, thus barring a subsequent re-
evaluation of a plea agreement, does nothing to solve the problem 
of domestic violence and fails to promote victim safety, offender 
accountability, or public confidence in our criminal system.172  The 
Jeffries decision will force trial courts to inadequately handle 
domestic violence cases in the future.  Prosecutors, law 
enforcement, and victim advocates are keenly aware that program 
intervention and appropriate sentences can encourage 
rehabilitation, increase safety for the victim, and lead to a more 
effective justice system.173  Accurate sentences must be treated as a 
matter of public concern and safety,174 especially in cases where the 
judge recognizes that an abuser will not be successful on 
probation.175  Allowing a judge to vacate a guilty plea in this type of 
situation, despite his use of unconditional language in accepting 
the plea, furthers the public safety goals of reducing domestic 
violence in our community.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision does not further this goal. 
3. Pre-Sentence Investigations Are Valuable Resources 
The trial court in Jeffries relied on the information in the PSI to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the sentence contained in the plea 
agreement.176  Courts should have the discretion to change an 




 171. Id. at 12. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See SAMPSON, supra note 113, at 26–28 (discussing the benefits of a 
“graded response” to domestic violence). 
 174. See HANDBOOK, supra note 165, at 8–9, for a statistical illustration of the 
impact domestic violence has on the public. 
 175. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 59–60 (Minn. 2011) (quoting the judge 
explaining on the record his reasons for no longer accepting the plea agreement). 
 176. Id. at 75 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the trial 
court based its decision to vacate the guilty plea on information in the PSI). 
 177. Id. at 71 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting); see Carl Edman & Cynthia E. Richman, 
Double Jeopardy, 89 GEO. L.J. 1439, 1478 (2001) (explaining that a post-conviction 
sentence can be modified if “the defendant has no legitimate expectation of 
finality in the original sentence”). 
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The intent of the statute requiring a PSI in domestic violence 
cases178 is to recognize the importance of accurate sentences in 
these types of cases where repeat offenses and escalating violence 
are not only common but predicted and expected.179  As the court 
of appeals has stated, “[A]ny behavior indicating an individual’s 
propensity for violence is related to domestic violence.”180 
A study on the handling of misdemeanor domestic violence 
cases in the suburban Hennepin County courts found that, in some 
cases, pre-sentence investigations were not ordered until after 
sentencing.181  “Conducting a PSI after sentencing minimizes its 
importance, disregards victim input, and makes revocations 
difficult.  As one probation officer put it, this practice is akin to a 
doctor writing a prescription without an exam.”182  For the same 
reason, a judge should not be able to lock in a certain sentence—
regardless of the language used at the plea hearing—because the 
plea hearing takes place prior to ordering the PSI.183  The Jeffries 
decision will result in a practice akin to doctors not being able to 
change the prescriptions they wrote after receiving the results of 
the exam. 
The Minnesota Court Information System (MNCIS)184 
indicates that Erik Jeffries was convicted of misdemeanor domestic 
assault in 2006.185  The original complaint186 in that case charged 
Jeffries with felony domestic assault by strangulation.187  Later in 
 
 178. MINN. STAT. § 609.2244 (2010). 
 179. WATCH, supra note 159, at 1. 
 180. State v. Moen, 752 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 181. WATCH, supra note 159, at 12. 
 182. Id. 
 183. MINN. STAT. § 609.2244, subdiv. 1 (requiring a PSI for defendants 
convicted of a domestic violence-related offense, therefore making it impossible to 
order a PSI prior to acceptance of a guilty plea). 
 184. The Minnesota court website offers public access to statewide electronic 
case records and the calendar management system.  MINN. JUD. BRANCH, MINN. 
COURT INFO. SYS., http://www.mncourts.gov/publicaccess (last visited Sept. 16, 
2012) [hereinafter MNCIS]. 
 185. MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”; 
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then 
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR                
-06-057311; then click “search”). 
 186. Complaint for State v. Jeffries, No. 27-CR-06-057311 (Aug. 22, 2006) (on 
file at the WATCH office).  
 187. MINN. STAT. § 609.2247 (2010).  Passed in 2005, this statute made 
domestic assault by strangulation a felony-level offense because “[p]rior to the 
law’s passage, most domestic strangulation cases were charged as misdemeanors 
even though strangulation is one of the most dangerous forms of domestic 
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2006, Jeffries was again convicted of domestic assault, enhanced to 
a gross misdemeanor because of the prior domestic-qualified 
conviction.188  Jeffries violated his conditions of probation in this 
case and a revocation hearing was held in 2007.189  Also in 2007, 
Jeffries was convicted of disorderly conduct, and upon closer review 
of the MNCIS report, that case was originally charged as a violation 
of an order for protection as well as disorderly conduct.190 
These are just some examples of what the judge may have 
learned upon reviewing the PSI that were unknown at the time of 
the acceptance of the first plea agreement.  These examples do not 
include Jeffries’s other felony and misdemeanor convictions.191  A 
 
violence and, according to the Hennepin County Fatality Review and other 
experts, is frequently a precursor to domestic homicide.”  HEATHER WOLFGRAM, 
WATCH, THE IMPACT OF MINNESOTA’S FELONY STRANGULATION LAW 2 (2007) 
(footnote omitted), available at http://www.watchmn.org/files/reports 
/Strangulation%20cover%20final%201-24-07.pdf.  “All batterers should be viewed 
as potentially lethal, though there are well-documented indicators of lethality of 
which everyone should be aware.  Included in the factors that have been identified 
as possible lethality indicators [is] . . . attempted strangulation.”  FEMICIDE REPORT, 
supra note 168, at 6. 
 188. MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”; 
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then 
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR                 
-06-083944; then click “search”).  “Whoever violates subdivision 1 within ten years 
of a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense conviction . . . is guilty of 
a gross misdemeanor.”  MINN. STAT. § 609.2242, subdiv. 2 (2010). 
 189.  MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”; 
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then 
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR                 
-06-083944; then click “search”). 
 190.  MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”; 
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then 
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR                 
-07-026258; then click “search”).  An order for protection is a civil order granting 
the petitioner relief from domestic violence in the form of no physical harm, no 
contact, and/or coordination of supervised child visitation, among other 
protective conditions.  If the order is violated, it is a criminal offense.  MINN. STAT. 
§ 518B.01, subdiv. 4, 6, 14 (2010). 
 191.  In addition to the domestic violence-related offenses, Jeffries was also 
convicted of the following (listed are only convictions on the public MNCIS record 
for Hennepin County, Minnesota): four counts of felony controlled substance 
crime in the fifth degree—possession (Case No. 27-CR-98-064348, 27-CR-99-
094531, 27-CR-00-067377, and 27-CR-03-058933); one count of felony sale of 
simulated controlled substance (Case No. 27-CR-02-056290); one count of felony 
forgery (Case No. 27-CR-06-041788); five counts of misdemeanor trespass (Case 
No. 27-CR-97-110680, 27-CR-98-032484, 27-CR-00-044706, 27-CR-02-095768, and 
27-CR-03-081437); one count of misdemeanor loitering with intent to buy or sell 
narcotics (Case No. 27-CR-98-043356); and one count of misdemeanor disorderly 
conduct (Case No. 27-CR-99-085929).  According to MNCIS, throughout these 
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defendant that seemingly has two prior misdemeanor domestic 
assaults looks very different than a defendant with three cases 
involving possibly serious domestic violence (including 
strangulation and violation of an order for protection), as well as 
numerous misdemeanor and felony convictions spanning a decade.  
The judge failed to defer his acceptance of the plea agreement on 
the record, but that does not mean a convicted felon and chronic 
domestic abuser should be sentenced to a probationary sentence 
that was accepted based on incomplete information at the plea 
hearing. 
The importance of PSIs should make it impossible for judges 
to lock themselves into a plea agreement without first reviewing the 
PSI.192  To do otherwise, such as the ruling in Jeffries, is to render 
the PSI worthless.  The judge acted for fair and just reasons when 
he vacated the guilty plea because he knew he could not properly 
adhere to the previously accepted probationary sentence after 
learning the extent of Jeffries’s criminal history in the PSI. 
4. The Court Should View a Judge’s Right to Vacate a Guilty Plea 
the Same as a Defendant’s Right to Withdraw a Guilty Plea 
The trial court vacated Jeffries’s plea agreement in an effort to 
rectify an inappropriate sentence, because the PSI indicated that 
Jeffries would not have been successful on probation.193  It would 
have been more appropriate for the court to explain on the record 
 
cases, there were seven probation violations hearings (this number does not 
account for every violation, just the violations that resulted in a hearing before the 
court).  See MNCIS, supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”; 
then click “I Accept”; then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then 
provide the required “CAPTCHA” security authorization and one of the cited case 
numbers; then click “search”). 
 192. PSIs include sections recommending sentences and treatment for 
defendants.  MINN. STAT. § 609.2244, subdiv. 2 (2010). 
 193. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Minn. 2011).  According to the State, 
Jeffries’s criminal history included eight prior felony and eleven gross 
misdemeanor or misdemeanor convictions.  Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, 
at 2.  Jeffries also violated his conditional release twice before his first sentencing 
hearing and then again by having contact with the victim prior to the second plea 
agreement.  Id.  Jeffries was also charged in 2009 with four counts of felony-level 
violations of a no-contact order that were dismissed when Jeffries was sentenced to 
his executed sixty-month sentence on the felony domestic assault case.  See MNCIS, 
supra note 184 (read through “Required Acknowledgement”; then click “I Accept”; 
then select “Criminal/Traffic/Petty Case Records”; then provide the required 
“CAPTCHA” security authorization and case number 27-CR-09-5620; then click 
“search”). 
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that it would not go along with the negotiated sentence and give 
Jeffries a choice whether to withdraw his plea or to continue with 
sentencing.194  This case note recognizes the poor choice of words 
used by the trial court when it said Jeffries was “convicted” at the 
plea hearing.195  But the trial court’s inaccurate word usage should 
not result in an inaccurate sentence for a defendant guilty of felony 
domestic assault.  Nor should the trial court be barred from 
correcting an inaccurate sentence when faced with new 
information about multiple prior convictions and probation 
violations—indicating high risks for recidivism and victim safety. 
Prior to sentencing, a defendant has a right to withdraw his or 
her guilty plea if the trial court determines it is “fair and just to do 
so.”196  After sentencing, the court must allow a defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea if “necessary to correct a manifest 
injustice.”197  The fair and just standard is a lower standard than the 
manifest injustice standard,198 but “it does not allow a defendant to 
withdraw a guilty plea ‘for simply any reason.’”199  Requiring a fair 
and just reason promotes the policies of finality as well as accuracy.  
Not allowing defendants to back out of a plea for just any reason 
promotes finality of judgments, while allowing room to withdraw 
guilty pleas for fair and just reasons200 promotes the policy of 
accuracy in sentences. 
In 1987, the Minnesota Supreme Court reiterated, “[I]f an 
unqualified promise is made on the sentence to be imposed, a 
 
 194. See State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 473, 160 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1968) 
(“[I]n the event the agreement is not fulfilled by the prosecutor or not acceptable 
to the court, the defendant should be afforded the option of either withdrawing 
or reaffirming his plea . . . .”). 
 195. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 59. 
 196. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2 (“In its discretion the court may allow 
the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to 
do so.  The court must give due consideration to the reasons advanced by the 
defendant in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion 
would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the 
defendant’s plea.”). 
 197. Id. subdiv. 1. 
 198. The fact that it is easier for a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before 
sentencing rather than after indicates that acceptance of a guilty plea does not 
carry the same level of finality as a sentence. 
 199. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v. 
Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 372 (Minn. 2007)). 
 200. For example, a fair and just reason to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea 
would be if the parties agreed to, and the court accepted, an unfair or unjust 
sentence, before review of all of the information.  See State v. Kunshier, 410 
N.W.2d 377, 379 n.1 (Minn. 1987). 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/13
  
330 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea if that 
promise is not fulfilled.”201  The trial court in Jeffries promised to 
impose the agreed-upon sentence pursuant to the plea deal when it 
accepted the guilty plea at the first plea hearing.202  When the trial 
court later indicated that it was not willing to impose that 
sentence,203 it did not fulfill its promise, thus allowing Jeffries to 
withdraw his guilty plea.204 
Acceptance of plea agreements is not final because defendants 
“do not forfeit their right to withdraw those pleas of guilty and 
stand trial if, because of later events, the trial court or the 
prosecution ethically change their minds about previous 
agreements that were reached.”205  In cases such as this, the result is 
the same regardless of whether the judge vacates the plea because 
it is fair and just to do so (instead of imposing a sentence the 
defendant had not contemplated when pleading guilty) or whether 
the judge gives the defendant the option to withdraw his plea 
because the judge has the sole discretion to determine whether 
withdrawal would be fair and just.206 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that double 
jeopardy does not attach when a defendant does not have a 
 
 201. Id. at 379 (citing State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. 1983); 
Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 1979)); see also Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1971) (stating that when the prosecution fails to keep 
a promise with regard to an accepted plea agreement, the case should be 
remanded to the trial court to determine whether specific performance of the 
agreement or withdrawal of the plea best serves the interests of justice); Olness v. 
State, 290 Minn. 198, 202, 186 N.W.2d 706, 709 (1971) (“Although a plea of guilty 
may be set aside where an unqualified promise is made as part of a plea bargain 
and is thereafter dishonored, a plea of guilty should not be set aside merely 
because the accused has not achieved his unwarranted hope.”). 
 202. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Minn. 2011). 
 203. Id. at 59–60. 
 204. The court has previously explained:  
Trial judges at sentencing even have the right to change their minds 
about a previous plea agreement they earlier deemed acceptable.  For 
instance, a presentence investigation may turn up facts unknown to all 
parties.  The point is that, whenever a defendant has pleaded guilty 
pursuant to his understanding that there is a plea bargain as to the 
charges or to the ultimate sentence, the defendant must be offered the 
right to withdraw that plea of guilty and stand trial if, for any reason, the 
trial judge exercises the discretion that is his not to follow the proposed 
agreement.   
Kunshier, 410 N.W.2d at 379 n.1. 
 205. Id. at 380 (citing State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 474--75, 160 N.W.2d 146, 
153 (1968)). 
 206. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2 (2010). 
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reasonable expectation of finality in the plea agreement because 
his sentence is conditioned on review of the PSI and victim input.207  
The Connecticut rules of practice allow a trial court to vacate an 
accepted plea agreement based on new information within a PSI 
and impose a different sentence or offer the defendant the choice 
to withdraw his plea.208  The court reasoned that plea agreements 
often do not involve “the kind of prosecutorial overreaching that 
the double jeopardy clause was designed to prevent” if the State did 
not break the plea agreement after gaining a benefit or if a second 
prosecution did not start anew.209  This reasoning aligns with the 
continuing jeopardy principle, which is based on a combination of 
interests, including “fairness to society, lack of finality, and limited 
waiver.”210 
When a defendant withdraws a plea, the same jeopardy 
continues and the defendant is not at risk of twice being put in 
jeopardy.211  If the court had Jeffries withdraw his plea on the 
record, instead of saying “I’m giving your pleas back,”212 then 
jeopardy would have continued and double-jeopardy concerns 
would not have been implicated.  But the result is the same and the 
policies the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect were not at 
risk.213  By vacating the guilty plea, the court did not subject Jeffries 
to two trials, two sentences, or two punishments. 
5. Advocating for an Alternative Rule: Extending the Fair and    
Just Standard 
The rules should allow judges to vacate a defendant’s guilty 
plea when it is “fair and just to do so,”214 extending the standard 
 
 207. State v. Thomas, 995 A.2d 65, 76–77 (Conn. 2010).  See generally Mark L. 
Hammond, Note, United States v. Patterson: When Does the Double Jeopardy Clause 
Protect Defendants in Federal Court?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 467, 470–74 (2005). 
 208. Thomas, 995 A.2d at 77 n.14. 
 209. Id. at 78; see also LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 25.1(d) n.68. 
 210. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 n.4 (1970) (discussing Green v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904)). 
 211. See Smith v. Phillips, No. 02–CV–6329, 2012 WL 1340070, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 17, 2012) (citing United States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271, 279 n.7 (2d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 816–17 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also 
Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause . . . 
does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.” 
(quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98–99 (1978))). 
 212. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Minn. 2011). 
 213. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 214. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2.  For an explanation of the 
requirements of the fair and just standard, see State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 
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applied to defendants’ motions for plea withdrawal prior to 
sentencing.215  When the information in the PSI indicated Jeffries 
would not be successful on probation,216 the judge’s decision to no 
longer adhere to the agreed-upon plea deal was appropriate in the 
interests of safety, accountability, and justice.217  Knowing that the 
sentence, which Jeffries relied upon in pleading guilty, would 
change, the judge fairly and justly vacated Jeffries’s guilty plea.218 
The fair and just standard maintains the finality principle at 
the heart of the Double Jeopardy Clause,219 yet allows for 
maximizing the accuracy of sentences in plea agreements by 
allowing the judge to change a sentence or vacate a guilty plea 
when necessary in the interests of fairness and justice.220  If this 
were the standard, when the judge vacated the guilty plea because 
of the information in the PSI, it would have been a fair and just 
action, allowing for continuation of the same jeopardy and 
therefore not implicating double-jeopardy concerns. 
Requiring judges to adhere to a fair and just standard 
promotes finality by not allowing judges to simply change their 
minds after a defendant may have relied on a particular agreement 
when pleading guilty.221  But it also encourages judges to impose 
accurate, appropriate, and just sentences after review of the PSI.  
This standard would better serve future cases concerning plea 
agreements. 
 
(Minn. 2010) (“The ‘fair and just’ standard requires district courts to give ‘due 
consideration’ to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant advances to support 
withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the State given 
reliance on the plea.”). 
 215. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2. 
 216. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 60. 
 217. See supra Part IV.A.2 for a discussion of the importance of accountability 
in domestic violence cases.  The Minnesota Supreme Court should have held that 
the trial judge can vacate a guilty plea when it is for a fair and just reason, such as 
ensuring appropriate sentences for repeat domestic abusers. 
 218. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 60. 
 219. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) and Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 188 (1957), for the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of the finality policy. 
 220. See Creekpaum, supra note 25, at 1188 (“A system of justice has no 
credibility without accuracy.”); id. at 1190 (“The acceptable level of accuracy will 
always be a value judgment, and it can only be achieved in balance with a 
competing value: finality.”). 
 221. See State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (stating 
that “more than a change of heart is needed to withdraw a guilty plea”); see also 
Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989) (discussing the need to protect 
the integrity of guilty pleas). 
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B. Entering a Guilty Plea Does Not Forfeit a Double-Jeopardy Plea 
In State ex rel. Boswell v. Tahash, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that double jeopardy was an affirmative defense that was 
forfeited if not raised at the appropriate time.222  The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled eight years later, in Menna v. New York, that a guilty 
plea does not prohibit a defendant from raising a double-jeopardy 
claim on appeal.223  In Menna, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from 
convicting a defendant a second time because the government 
lacks the authority to bring a defendant into court a second time.224  
Thus, a guilty plea does not bar a double-jeopardy claim when the 
defendant asserts the right not to be twice put in jeopardy.225  If the 
double-jeopardy claim were valid, it would bar the government 
from initiating new proceedings against the defendant, therefore 
necessitating the defendant’s right to assert such a claim.226 
On review of the Jeffries case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
concluded that Menna was not binding on Minnesota courts 
because “the scope of waiver by guilty plea is a matter of state law, 
not federal constitutional law.”227  The court of appeals held that 
double jeopardy is an affirmative defense that was “waived by 
Jeffries’s subsequent counseled plea of guilty.”228  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and 
adopted the Menna rule,229 concluding that Jeffries did not forfeit 
his double-jeopardy claim by pleading guilty.230 
The State argued that Menna was not binding because state law 
controls procedural issues such as forfeiture.231  The U.S. Supreme 
 
 222. 278 Minn. 408, 415, 154 N.W.2d 813, 817–18 (1967). 
 223. 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (per curiam). 
 224. Id.; see Long v. McCotter, 792 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1986); Edman & 
Richman, supra note 177, at 1475 n.1431. 
 225. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62. 
 226. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974). 
 227. State v. Jeffries, 787 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806 
N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011) (relying on State v. Kelty, 716 N.W.2d 886, 894 (Wis. 
2006)). 
 228. Id. at 661. 
 229. Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2 (“We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a 
charge does not waive a claim that judged on its face the charge is one which the 
State may not constitutionally prosecute.”) 
 230. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 65. 
 231. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 17 (citing Danforth v. Minnesota, 
552 U.S. 264, 290 (2008)).  “[The] state procedural requirement that an appellant 
must raise an affirmative defense below or forfeit it for purposes of appeal is a 
matter of state law.  The Supreme Court’s procedural exception in Menna is 
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Court declared in Danforth v. Minnesota, “[T]he availability or 
nonavailability of remedies . . . is a mixed question of state and 
federal law.’”232  The State maintained in Jeffries that “Minnesota’s 
waiver rule is simply a limit on the availability of a remedy to a 
litigant, a process left to state law.”233  Relying on Danforth, the State 
advocated that the court view waiver as “a procedural requirement 
controlled by state law and distinct from the nature of the right 
itself.”234  The State explained in its brief to the court, “[T]he court 
of appeals found that the procedural consequences attendant to a 
waiver of a constitutional right (as opposed to the existence of a 
constitutional right) is a matter of state law.”235  The State 
maintained that the court of appeals correctly held that Jeffries 
“waived the benefit of that original deal when he negotiated a new 
one.”236 
But the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with Jeffries’s 
interpretation of Menna as not “grounded in waiver, but in the 
defendant’s constitutional right not to be haled into court on a 
charge.”237  The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Blackledge v. 
Perry supports this interpretation.238  In Blackledge, the Court 
declared that the defendant could not waive certain due process 
rights that go “to the very power of the State to bring the defendant 
into court.”239  Likewise, in Robinson v. Neil, the Court stated, 
“[T]his guarantee . . . is a constitutional right of the criminal 
defendant [and] its practical result is to prevent a trial from taking 
place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern 
the conduct of a trial.”240  Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
correctly interpreted Menna as a substantive rule based on 
constitutional and federal law, not as a procedural rule.241 
 
inapplicable.”  Id. at 15. 
 232. Danforth, 552 U.S. at 291 (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 
U.S. 167, 205 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 233. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 16. 
 234. Id. at 17 (“A distinct application of a remedy available in state court ‘does 
not imply that there [was] no right and thus no violation of that right at the time 
of trial—only that no remedy will [be provided in federal habeas courts].’” 
(quoting Danforth, 552 U.S. at 291)). 
 235. Id. at 15 (citing State v. Jeffries, 787 N.W.2d 654, 660–61 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2010), rev’d, 806 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 2011)). 
 236. Id. at 18. 
 237. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 83, at 13. 
 238. 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974). 
 239. Id. at 30. 
 240. 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973). 
 241. State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56, 65 (Minn. 2011). 
29
Light: Criminal Law: The Tension between Finality and Accuracy: Double J
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
 
2012] DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN GUILTY PLEAS 335 
While the State incorrectly characterized Jeffries’s second 
guilty plea as forfeiting a double-jeopardy plea, its argument points 
persuasively to the fact that Jeffries was not in danger of double 
jeopardy because Jeffries’s second plea was the continuation of plea 
negotiations after the first deal was rejected.242  He was not 
punished twice—rather he was trying to “mitigate his risk” within 
the one and only negotiation of his sentence, prior to any finality of 
judgment.243  The court was correct that non-assertion of a double-
jeopardy claim could not forfeit the right to plead double jeopardy 
on appeal, but it was incorrect to decide that the conviction at the 
first plea hearing raised double-jeopardy concerns and barred 
subsequent vacation of that plea. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The court correctly adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding 
in Menna, concluding that Jeffries’s second guilty plea did not bar a 
double-jeopardy claim.244  Jeffries appropriately brought Minnesota 
precedent in line with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  However, 
the court incorrectly analyzed Jeffries’s double-jeopardy claim. 
The majority failed to analyze whether the conviction at the 
first plea hearing should have barred the second guilty plea under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Chief Justice Gildea’s dissenting 
opinion correctly criticized the majority’s analysis as “overly 
simplistic.”245  The majority ignored important policy analysis in 
determining whether a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
occurred, and its favoritism of finality will have far-reaching 
consequences on the accuracy of future sentences based on plea 
agreements.  Especially in domestic violence cases, the goal of 
imposing appropriate sentences should outweigh any sense of 
finality attached to acceptances of plea agreements.  To further the 
policies of both finality and accuracy, the court should have 
extended the fair and just standard to judges who seek to vacate a 
guilty plea when new information regarding the defendant 
convinces them that a plea agreement is inappropriate. 
 
 
 242. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 101, at 17–18. 
 243. Id. at 18. 
 244. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d at 65. 
 245. Id. at 70 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting). 
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